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PENRY v. LYNAUGH
109 S. Ct. 2934,106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Johnny Paul Penry, a mentally retarded, 22-year-old man, was
convicted of the rape and murder of Pamela Carpenter and sentenced
to death under the Texas capital murder scheme. In the penalty phase
of the bifurcated trial, Texas juries must answer yes or no to three
special issues:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of
the deceased was committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or
another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society (i.e., future dangerousness); and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the
defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in
response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
If the jury unanimously answers yes to all three questions, the trial
court must sentence the defendant to death.
At Penry's penalty trial, the jury answered yes to all three
questions and, accordingly, the court sentenced Penmy to death. His
conviction was upheld on direct appeal. On appeal of the denial of
federal habeas corpus relief, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that Penry's argument that the
jury could not give effect to Penry's mitigating evidence regarding
his mental retardation was meritorious. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit
held that prior Circuit decisions required the court to affirm Penry's
sentence.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
two questions: first, whether Penry's death sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment because the jury was not instructed that it could
consider and give effect to Penry's mitigation evidence of mental
retardation, and second, whether the Eighth Amendment categori-
cally prohibits Penry's execution because of his mental retardation.
As a threshold matter, in light of it's recent decision in Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. __, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) that
"new rules," that is rules of criminal procedure that break new ground
or place a new obligation on the state, will not be applied or an-
nounced in cases on collateral review unless they fall into one of two
exceptions, the Supreme Court considered (a) whether Teague
applies to a capital sentencing trial and (b) if so, whether the relief
Penry sought (a new jury instruction) was a "new rule." It held that
the Teague non-retroactivity rule did apply in capital sentencing
trials. The Court held that a criminal judgment necessarily includes
the sentence imposed. Having decided that Teague applied, however,
the Court determined that the rule Penry requested - that Texas juries
be instructed such that they can consider and give effect to all of
defendant's mitigating evidence -did not announce a new rule under
Teague.
The Court stated that it was clear from Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978) and Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982), both
decided before Penry's sentence became final, that a State could not,
consistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, prevent the
sentencer from considering and giving effect to evidence relevant to
the defendant's background or character or to the circumstances of
the offense that a defendant proffers. The Court found that granting
Penry's request would not be a new rule applied to Texas because it
was a "logical extension" of the duty placed on the sentencer by
Lockett and Eddings.
HOLDING
A. No Categorical Prohibition Against Executing Mentally
Retarded Defendants.
The Supreme Court held that "insufficient evidence of a national
consensus against executing mentally retarded people convicted of
capital offenses [exists] for us to conclude that it is categorically
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment." Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2955, 106
L. Ed. 2d at 289. The Court implied that, while it may violate the
Eighth Amendment to execute defendants who are "severely" or
"profoundly" retarded, such as those having an I.Q. of less than 35-
40, Penry was not in that category. This claim was decided using the
framework created by the court for determining whether the "evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society" render a penalty cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). For a discussion of
the constitutional framework of this type of analysis, see the
discussion of Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. __, 109 S. Ct. 2969,
106 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1989) [this issue].
B. Jurors Must Be Able to Consider AND GIVE EFFECT to
ANY Evidence Defendant May Present in Mitigation; Texas
Procedure Did Not Permit This.
While the Supreme Court refused to hold that mentally retarded
persons may not be executed, the Court agreed with Penry that the
three special questions in the Texas penalty trial did not allow the
jury to give mitigating effect to the evidence of Penry's mental
retardation.
Having met the threshold question of whether the Court could
render the relief Penry sought under Teague, the Court discussed the
merits of Penry's claim. The Court concluded that none of the special
jury questions Texas juries must answer provided a vehicle by which
the jury could give mitigating effect to Penry's evidence of mental
retardation.
The State of Texas conceded that, "if a juror concluded that
Penry acted deliberately and was likely to be dangerous in the future,
but also concluded that because of his mental retardation he was not
sufficiently culpable to deserve the death penalty, that juror would be
unable to give effect to that mitigating evidence under the instruc-
tions given in this case." Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2951, 106 L. Ed. 2d at
283. Nevertheless, Texas argued that if the Supreme Court required
trial courts to instruct juries that they may, in their discretion, grant
the defendant mercy, the result would be the type of "unbridled
discretion" which the Court renounced in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238,92 S. Ct. 2726,33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972).
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court noted that language in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859
(1976) made clear that, "so long as the class of murderers subject to
capital punishment is narrowed, there is no constitutional infirmity in
a procedure that allows a jury to recommend mercy based on the
mitigating evidence introduced by a defendant." Penry, 109 S. Ct. at
2951, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 283. The Supreme Court noted further that the
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imposition of the death penalty must be "directly related to the
culpability of the defendant..." Id. Accordingly, the Court held that
the jury must be advised that it may consider and give effect to any
mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's background, character,
or the circumstances of the offense. Since Penry's jury was unable to
do so, the Supreme Court remanded Penry's case for resentencing.
ANALYSIS
Virginia attorneys representing capital defendants should be
aware of similarities between the Texas and Virginia capital murder
statutes which may make portions of Penry applicable to the Virginia
statute. Virginia, like Texas, has a bifurcated capital murder scheme.
Both states narrow the class of murderers who may be convicted of
capital murder. The critical aggravating factor in Texas is whether the
defendant will be dangerous in the future. Texas, however, asks the
jury to answer "yes" or "no" to three special jury issues. If the jury
unanimously answers all three questions "yes", the court must
sentence the defendant to death. Because none of the questions
allowed the jury in Penry to consider and give effect to Penry's
mental retardation, the Supreme Court sent Penry back to state court
for resentencing, with the jury instructed that it was free to return a
verdict of life imprisonment in spite of the answers to the specific
questions.
In Virginia, the State attempts to prove one of two aggravating
factors during the penalty phase of the capital murder trial. Va. Code
Ann. § 19.2-264.2. Like Texas, if Virginia jurors find that "there is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society," Id., then
the jury may sentence the defendant to death. This standard has been
labeled the "future dangerousness" criterion. The second aggravating
factor described by Code § 19.2-264.2 is the concept of "vileness,"
that the defendant's "conduct in committing the offense...was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim..."
Id.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has explicitly recognized that
evidence of a defendant's mental retardation is mitigating evidence.
Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 549, 323 S.E.2d 577,
586 (1984) (stating that defendant has a right to offer evidence of
mental retardation in mitigation even if defendant does not assert an
insanity defense). Although this is the law in Virginia, Virginia juries
currently are not instructed specifically that mental retardation may
be considered as mitigating evidence. Further, the Supreme Court of
Virginia has held that trial courts are not required to explain to juries
that they may sentence the defendant to life imprisonment even if
they find both aggravating factors; vileness and future dangerousness.
Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,479-480, 248 S.E.2d 135, 150
(1978). Juries are told that if they find one or both of the aggravating
factors in the sentencing statute, they may sentence the defendant to
death. Id. According to the Supreme Court of Virginia, "What a jury
may' do it is at liberty not to do." Id.
This procedure is questionable in cases where there is evidence
relating to a defendant's mental retardation. The Penry Court noted
-that although evidence of mental retardation is relevant to the
question of future dangerousness, it is relevant only as an aggravat-
ing factor. Rather than mitigating against a death sentence, mental
retardation and evidence of a defendant's inability to control his
actions indicates that he will be dangerous in the future. The Penry
Court noted that evidence of mental retardation and inability to learn
from his mistakes made the jury more likely, not less likely to answer
the question of Penry's future dangerousness "yes." Accordingly, the
future dangerousness question "did not provide a vehicle for the jury
to give mitigating effect to Penry's evidence of mental retardation
and childhood abuse." Id.
Similarly, unless Virginia juries are specifically instructed that
they may consider a defendant's mental retardation as a mitigating
factor and may, regardless of whether they find future dangerousness
or vileness, sentence the defendant to life in prison, juries may
actually consider the defendant's retardation as evidence of his future
dangerousness. It is critical that counsel representing defendants with
special mitigating circumstances, not limited to mental retardation, be
aware of the Penry decision.
Particularly, if there is evidence of a mitigating condition which
makes the defendant less culpable but arguably dangerous in the
future, counsel should prepare jury instructions to remedy the
situation. The instructions should, first, specifically inform the jury
that mental retardation (or other mitigating conditions) may be
considered and acted upon as mitigating evidence. Second, the
instructions should tell the jurors that they may vote for life
imprisonment even if they find one or both aggravating factors. If the
trial court refuses to give the requested instructions, counsel should
object in open court, on the record to the failure of the trial court to
so instruct the jury.
Summary and analysis by: Diane U. Montgomery
